Sync current sources: clean RAP handover names, app rebind, tooling
Working-tree state as of 2026-09-29, uncommitted since the initial "upload current sources" commit: - docs/handover/rap/: renamed the 11 generator-suffixed sources (zz*000) to the clean object names built on the tenant, plus the A2X leg and parameter-entity edits. - app/: manifest, annotations, i18n, mock data and local/mock ui5 configs updated to the live service shape. - PRD.md, CHANGELOG.md, KNOWLEDGE.md: build record through 2026-09-19, including the rejected reentrance-ticket path. - tools/adt-reentrance-login/: retained login helper (new). - docs/v2/zui_arena_change_appr_o4.metadata.xml: captured live $metadata (new). - Dropped a stray 0.3GB-class Eclipse installer that the initial commit had tracked under a URL-mangled filename, and the machine-specific 0M7DEJI.code-workspace. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# adt-reentrance-login
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Capture an SAP **ADT reentrance ticket** through a **localhost redirect**, so
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`abap-adt-mcp` can log on to the S/4HANA Cloud development tenant from this
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headless / SSH-only host — without a browser window on the server's desktop.
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Node 24, standard library only, no dependencies, no install step.
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---
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## Why this exists
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`abap-adt-mcp` 2.1.0 can do browser SSO, but only by launching a **server-side**
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Chrome window (`headless: false`) and harvesting cookies over the DevTools
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protocol; there is no localhost redirect in that path, so over multi-hop SSH
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neither the desktop nor a DevTools relay is reachable in practice
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[KNOWLEDGE.md, 2026-09-16].
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ADT for VS Code does it differently. It opens
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```
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https://<tenant>/sap/bc/adt/core/http/reentranceticket?redirect-url=http://localhost:<port>/adt/redirect
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```
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and reads the ticket back out of the redirect
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```
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http://localhost:<port>/adt/redirect?...&reentrance-ticket=<ticket>
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```
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(observed 2026-09-16). That half is portable: **your** browser does the SSO, the
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tenant redirects to `localhost`, and a forwarded TCP port puts "localhost" back
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on this host. This script is that listener.
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---
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## Run it
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Three steps, three terminals-worth of context. Values below use the defaults
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(tenant `my431353`, port `42010`, 300 s timeout).
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### 1. Start the helper on this host
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```bash
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node /home/alexz/projects/sap-integrations-mcl/arena-plm/tools/adt-reentrance-login/login.mjs
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```
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It prints (to stderr) the port to forward and the URL to open, then waits up to
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300 seconds for exactly one redirect.
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### 2. Forward the port to the machine running your browser
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**VS Code:** open the **Ports** panel (`Ctrl+Shift+P` → *Ports: Focus on Ports
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View*) → **Forward a Port** → enter `42010`. VS Code forwards it to your local
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`localhost:42010`.
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**Plain SSH**, from your laptop:
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```bash
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ssh -L 42010:127.0.0.1:42010 <this-host>
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```
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The browser must reach **this host's** localhost. Without the forward the tenant
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redirects your browser to its own machine and nothing is captured.
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### 3. Open the URL in that browser and complete SSO
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```
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https://my431353.s4hana.cloud.sap/sap/bc/adt/core/http/reentranceticket?redirect-url=http://localhost:42010/adt/redirect
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```
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(Or capture it programmatically: `node login.mjs --print-url-only`.)
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After SSO the tab lands on "Ticket captured", the helper writes
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`~/.abap-adt-mcp/ticket.json` (mode 0600) and exits 0.
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### 4. Make the MCP server pick it up
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`~/.abap-adt-mcp/ticket-provider.sh` already `cat`s that file, and
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`abap-adt-mcp` caches the login per destination — it only re-runs the provider
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on an explicit `login` call or a `reauthenticate`
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(`dist/index.js:268-292`, `615-625`, read 2026-09-18). So after capturing a
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fresh ticket, call the MCP `login` tool for the destination.
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---
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## Options
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| Flag | Default | Meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `--tenant <url>` | `https://my431353.s4hana.cloud.sap` | Tenant base URL. The UI host, not the `-api` host. |
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| `--port <n>` | `42010` | Loopback port. Bound to `127.0.0.1` **only**; there is no flag to change the bind address. |
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| `--timeout <seconds>` | `300` | Give up and write nothing. |
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| `--out <path>` | `~/.abap-adt-mcp/ticket.json` | Output file, mode 0600 (directory created 0700). |
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| `--client <nnn>` | *not sent* | Adds `sap-client=<nnn>`. See "Which client?" below. |
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| `--allow-host <name>` | — | Additionally accept this `Host` header (repeatable), for tunnelled forwards that are not `localhost`. |
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| `--probe` | off | After capture, test cookie vs header transport (below). |
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| `--print-url-only` | off | Print the logon URL to **stdout** and exit; start no listener. |
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| `--help` | — | Usage. |
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Exit codes: `0` captured · `2` usage · `3` timeout · `4` cannot bind · `5`
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redirect arrived without a usable ticket.
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### Which client?
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Nothing is hard-coded. The client the browser session uses is unconfirmed; the
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published service URL shows `sap-client=080`, but that is the API host's
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service URL, not proof about the UI logon. Run without `--client` first; only
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add `--client 080` if the tenant needs it.
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---
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## Probe mode (`--probe`)
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Open question this settles: SAP documents a **logon ticket** in the `MYSAPSSO2`
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**cookie** and an **assertion ticket** in a `mysapsso2` **header**
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[source: sap-docs sap-help loio 3354605668 and 3361378221, verified
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2026-09-18]. Which one a *reentrance* ticket behaves as is **unknown**, and it
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decides whether `abap-adt-mcp`'s `sso2` mode can work at all — that mode sends
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the value strictly as a **cookie** (`dist/lib/sso2TicketProvider.js`, read
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2026-09-18).
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With `--probe`, after capture the helper makes two GETs to
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`<tenant>/sap/bc/adt/core/discovery` with `Accept: application/atomsvc+xml` and
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**no other credentials**:
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- **(a)** `Cookie: MYSAPSSO2=<ticket>`
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- **(b)** `MYSAPSSO2: <ticket>`
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and reports only the HTTP status of each, whether a `set-cookie` with
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`SAP_SESSIONID` came back, and which succeeded. Bodies are discarded unread. A
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redirect is reported by **host only** (a SAML `Location` can carry request
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material).
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Read the verdict as:
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- **cookie worked** → `abap-adt-mcp`'s `sso2` mode works as-is.
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- **only the header worked** → `sso2` mode **cannot** use this ticket; the MCP
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server would need a header transport it does not have.
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- **neither** → expired ticket, wrong client, or wrong mechanism entirely.
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---
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## Ticket lifetime
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- **The lifetime of a reentrance ticket is not verified here.** Treat it as
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short-lived and re-run the helper whenever logon fails. Do not assume the
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8-hour default of a classic SAP logon ticket applies.
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- Whether a reentrance ticket is **single-use** is also unverified. If a
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captured ticket authenticates once and then stops, assume single-use and
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re-capture.
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- Expiry surfaces in the ADT MCP only as **"Your user was logged off."**
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`abap_list_destinations` and `get_object_type_details` still answer, so
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neither proves a live session; `abap_creation-run_validation` is the cheapest
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read-only liveness check [KNOWLEDGE.md, 2026-09-16].
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---
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## Security rules
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These are contracts, not preferences. The ticket is a **live logon credential**
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for the tenant.
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1. **The ticket is never printed, logged, or put in an error message, argv, or
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an environment variable.** The only place it is written is `--out`, mode
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0600. Validation failures report the *reason* and the parameter *names*
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present — never values, never offending characters or positions.
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2. **stdout stays empty.** Every human-readable message goes to stderr, so
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nothing sensitive can be captured by a `$(...)` around the helper. The single
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exception is `--print-url-only`, which prints the (secret-free) logon URL.
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3. **The listener binds `127.0.0.1` only** and is one-shot. There is no flag to
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bind a wider interface. A `Host` header that is not a loopback name is
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refused (cheap DNS-rebinding guard); allow a specific tunnel name with
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`--allow-host`.
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4. **Never paste the redirect URL** into a chat, issue, log, or file — it
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contains the ticket. Note that the URL also lands in **your browser's
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history**; clear it on a shared machine.
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5. The output file is written with permissions set **before** any ticket byte
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reaches the disk (`open` + `fchmod` + `write`), so a pre-existing
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world-readable file cannot briefly expose it.
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6. Ticket values are validated against the RFC 6265 cookie-octet set copied
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verbatim from `abap-adt-mcp` — a ticket the MCP server would reject is
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rejected here instead of being written to a file that cannot work.
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### Percent-decoding, and why not `URLSearchParams`
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The ticket is URL-decoded **exactly once** with `decodeURIComponent` over the
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raw query pair, and never re-encoded.
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`URLSearchParams` is deliberately **not** used: it applies
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`application/x-www-form-urlencoded` rules and turns a literal `+` into a space.
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Measured on Node v24.15.0, 2026-09-18:
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```
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'?reentrance-ticket=AB%2BCD+EF%3d'
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searchParams.get(...) -> 'AB+CD EF=' <-- space, corrupt
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decodeURIComponent(raw pair) -> 'AB+CD+EF=' <-- correct
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```
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A space is not a legal cookie-octet, so a base64 ticket carrying `+` would be
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silently corrupted and then rejected.
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---
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## Configuration (handled by the repo owner, documented here for reference)
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This script does **not** touch `~/.abap-adt-mcp/systems.json` or `.mcp.json`.
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For the record, `abap-adt-mcp` 2.1.0 requires for `authType: "sso2"`
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(`dist/lib/systems.js:73-149`, read 2026-09-18):
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- `sso2.command` must be an **absolute executable path** (`sso2.args` optional,
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`sso2.timeoutMs` 1000–300000);
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- the system `url` must be **HTTPS** ("so the ticket is never sent in
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plaintext");
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- `insecureTls` is refused in combination with `sso2`;
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- `authType: "ticket"` is accepted as an alias for `sso2`;
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- the server warns at startup that every remote caller of an `sso2` destination
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shares the SAP identity of the user running it — one server instance per
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person.
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---
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## Troubleshooting
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| Symptom | Cause |
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| Browser cannot reach `localhost:42010` | Port not forwarded, or forwarded to the wrong host. Re-check step 2. |
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| `port ... is already in use` (exit 4) | Another listener. Use `--port <n>` and forward **that** port. |
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| `Timed out ... Nothing was written.` (exit 3) | SSO never completed, or the redirect went to the wrong machine. |
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| `the redirect carried no reentrance-ticket parameter` (exit 5) | The tenant redirected without a ticket — usually a failed or cancelled SSO. The parameter names it *did* send are listed. |
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| `ticket contains characters outside the RFC 6265 cookie-octet set` (exit 5) | The value is not usable as a `MYSAPSSO2` cookie; `abap-adt-mcp` would reject it too. |
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| `Refused a redirect with Host: ...` | Forward is not a plain localhost forward. Re-run with `--allow-host <that-host>`. |
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